INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (CYBER IR)

JURUSAN HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL

NAMA DOSEN : H.BUDI MULYANA, S.IP

NAMA MAHASISWA : WAHYU NURDIANA

NIM : 44303010

KELOMPOK KAWASAN              : ASIA PASIFIK

NAMA NEGARA : PAPUA NEW GUINEA

1. BAGAN KAPABILITAS POLITIK NEGARA

2. Resume Weekly News (event)

(a) Kondisi PNG

Jumlah penduduk PNG sekitar 3,9 juta, terdiri atas ratusan suku primitif. Elite nya memperoleh didikan Australia-Anglosakson. Sejak merdeka PNG mempraktikkan sistem politik demokrasi parlementer ala Westminster, tetapi dengan warna dan bumbu sendiri. Tentara dan polisi tunduk pada sipil. Sistem kepartaiannya meniru Australia-Anglosakson, dengan adanya partai oposisi yang dapat mengganti partai berkuasa. Ada kalanya terbentuk pula kabinet koalisi. Partai-partai politik PNG berkembang sekitar tokoh-tokoh  perorangan dan suku-suku, dan tidak berdasarkan ideologi tertentu.

    Sistem pendidikannya cukup maju. Di ibu kota Port Moresby ada sebuah universitas dengan berbagai fakultas. Sedangkan di kota Lae ada sebuah IKIP untuk pendidikan guru. Perekonomiannya cukup maju, dengan penghasilan tembaga, emas, kopi, kopra dan berbagai hasil hutan lainnya. Tetapi primadona penghasilan ialah tembaga, yang terutama dihasilkan di kepulauan Bougainville.  Papua Nugini yang berbatasan dengan Propinsi Irian Jaya, kini mengalami gejolak luar biasa. Ada yang mengatakan krisis politik dan militer ini paling buruk setelah Papua Nugini ( PNG ), memperoleh kemerdekaan 22 tahun lalu.

Diduga kekayaan tembaga di Bougainville inilah yang menjadi akar permasalahan gejolak di PNG. Elite penduduk Bougainville, yang secara etnis dan  kultural berbeda dengan suku-suku etnis yang berkuasa di Port Moresby, menuntut bagian yang layak bagi hasil tembaga, yang dieksploitasi maskapai Australia-Inggris Broken Hill Property. Oleh karena tuntutan ini tidak dipenuhi, pada tahun 1990 Bougainville memisahkan diri, sambil membentuk suatu self-styled Bougainville Revolutionary Army;  suatu tentara revolusioner sendiri. PNG dengan tentaranya sekitar  4.700 tentara membalas dengan blokade, tetapi tidak efektif. Sejak itu banyak korban berjatuhan dari kedua pihak. Baru-baru ini PM PNG, Sir Julius Chan, mengambil tindakan drastis untuk menumpas separatisme di Bougainville itu. Oleh karena tentaranya tidak dapat menumpasnya, PM Chan mendatangkan 70 tentara bayaran dari Afrika Selatan, melalui perusahaan Inggris Sandline International dengan biaya 36 juta dolar AS, yang separuh sudah harus dibayar lebih dulu. Secara resmi, tentara bayaran ini dinamakan ”penasihat militer”. Namun tugas sebenarnya ialah menghancurkan tentara separatis. Untuk itu, tentara bayaran itu akan diperkuat pula dengan persenjataan lengkap, termasuk helikopter, dan roket.

Orang meragukan, apakah tentara bayaran ini nanti dapat menguasai Bougainville, sebab daerahnya penuh dengan hutan tropis lebat. Dulu sewaktu Perang Pasifik tidak kurang dari 37.000 tentara Jepang mati, karena berbagai penyakit dan kurang makan. Sekarang ini pun sekitar 200 tentara PNG telah gugur, dan sekitar 10.000 penduduk Bougainville meninggal dunia; kebanyakan karena sakit menular dan kurang makan akibat blokade. Tetapi Bougainville, di bawah pimpinan pemimpinnya, Francis Ona, bertahan dari Jenderal Jerry Singirok, Pemimpin Tentara PNG. Ia menuntut PM Julius Chan mundur. Sebaliknya PM memecat Jenderal Singirok.

Konflik ini tidak hanya membara di parlemen, tetapi menjalar juga ke luar parlemen. Semula PM Julius Chan tidak mau tunduk pada tuntutan tentara dan rakyat banyak. Dia mengandalkan pada dukungan polisi dan parlemen. Tetapi akhirnya dia bersama dengan beberapa menteri lainnya, mengundurkan diri. Kabinet telah menunjuk sebagai pejabat PM, John Giheno, salah seorang menteri lain. Pejabat PM baru ini menyatakan keyakinannya, bahwa tentara PNG akan tetap setia pada konstitusi PNG, yaitu mengakui supremasinya pemerintahan sipil yang baru ini. Dengan begini diharapkan, bahwa watak civil society dari PNG dapat dipertahankan terus, dipelihara dan dibina sebaik-baiknya.

 (b) Kaitan antara kondisi PNG dengan Kapabilitas Negara

Pemerintahan Papua Nugini berada dibawah konstitusi 1975 merupakan negara dengan sistem demokrasi Parlementer dibawah kekuasaan Monarki konstitusional, selain itu negara ini juga tergabung dalam organisasi persemakmuran yang mengakui monarki Inggris sebagai raja yang berkuasa, dan sebagai simbol kepala Negara. Lembaga Negaranya adalah Majelis Parlemen Unikameral ( 1 kamar ). Perdana Menteri adalah kepala pemerintahan yaitu pimpinan dari partai mayoritas  dalam majelis parlemen dan membentuk kabinetnya diantara para anggota parlemen.

         Semenjak Papua Nugini memperoleh kemerdekaan dari Australia pada 1975, tatanan politik negara ini tidak stabil. Disana timbul berbagai permasalahan seperti terjadinya konflik internal di Bougenvile. Terjadinya konflik perebutan ladang tembaga di Papua Nugini ini, tidak saja memanas didalam parlemen itu sendiri akan tetapi hal ini juga menjalar sampai keluar parlemen. Sebagai contoh ; semula PM Julius Chan yang tidak mau tunduk pada rakyat dan tentara, akhirnya mengundurkan diri dari kabinet, dan kemudian kabinet menunjuk PM baru yakni John Giheno. Dari pejabat baru tersebut, diharapkan supremasi pemerintahan akan berjalan dengan baik. Munculnya berbagai permasalahan seperti perebutan ladang tembaga di bougenvile, telah merubah tatanan pemerintahan sipil PNG.

Selain itu ada juga permasalahan lain seperti masalah perbatasan antara Irian Jaya ( indonesia ) dengan PNG, dan Juga perbatasan teritorial dengan Australia. Permasalahn perbatasan yang terjadi dengan Indonesia, Indonesia menempatkan sejumlah pasukan di perbatasan Irian – PNG. Namun dengan penempatan pasukan tersebut membuat kekhawatiran sejumlah warga disana. Selain itu permasalahan perbatasan teritorial yang terjadi dengan Australia telah membuat hubungan diantara kedua negara ini memanas.

Kalau dikaitkan dengan keadaan kapabilitas yang dimiliki oleh PNG, maka kondisi yang terjadi di PNG, khususnya permasalahan yang terjadi di Kep. Bougenville akan bisa ditangani secara baik oleh pemerintahan PNG, terlebih setelah Pemerintahan ini mendatangkan bantuan 70 tentara bayaran dari Afrika Selatan, melalui perusahaan Inggris Sandline International dengan biaya 36 juta dolar AS, yang separuh sudah harus dibayar lebih dulu. Secara resmi, tentara bayaran ini dinamakan ”penasihat militer”. Namun tugas sebenarnya ialah menghancurkan tentara separatis di Bougenville. Untuk itu, tentara bayaran itu akan diperkuat pula dengan persenjataan lengkap, termasuk helikopter, dan roket. Pemerintahan melakukan ini semua karena salah satu sumber pendapatan ekonomi mereka adalah didapat dari pertambangan mineral seperti tembaga yang dihasilkan di Bougenville.

3. Perbandingan kapabilitas negara PNG dengan negara-negara kelompok kawasan lain

Kapabilitas politik Papua Nugini secara umum seperti yang tertera pada bagan diatas adalah merupakan salah satu bukti nyata dari kekuatan negara dalam berbagai bidang yang meliputi kekuatan ideologi negara, kekuatan ekonomi dan tekhnologi, kekuatan militer, kekuatan geografi, demografi, dan diplomasi, hal ini merupakan suatu pondasi yang kuat bagi kelangsungan tatanan pemerintahan yang makmur, aman dan nyaman, serta dapat mencegah dari adanya berbagai gangguan yang dapat mengancam kedaulatan wilayah Papua Nugini.

Pemerintahan Papua Nugini yang berada dibawah konstitusi 1975 merupakan negara dengan sistem demokrasi Parlementer dibawah kekuasaan Monarki konstitusional, selain itu negara ini juga tergabung dalam organisasi persemakmuran yang mengakui monarki Inggris sebagai raja yang berkuasa, dan sebagai simbol kepala Negara.

Kalau kita lihat kapabilitas negara lain khususnya yang masih dalam satu kawasan seperti Australia yang berhaluan liberalisme, Fiji, Selandia Baru yang berhaluan liberalisme, dan Timor Timur yang berhaluan Demokrasi, serta kekuatan militer yang dimilikinya, maka keberadaan Papua Nugini masih menjadi perhitungan bagi negara dikawasan lain untuk bersaing kearah yang lebih baik lagi demi mencapai tujuan negara secara keseluruhan yakni untuk memberikan rasa nyaman, aman, dan tentram terhadap semua warga.

Selain itu keberadaan konflik internal yang tidak akan lepas dari semua negara, Papua Nugini sebagai salah satu negara yang rawan akan konflik internal, telah berhasil menyelesaikan semua permasalahan tersebut. Ya meskipun sampai sekarang masih ada pihak yang kontra dengan Pemerintahan yang demo disana sini untuk menentang kebijakan pemerintahan, namun pemerintah tetap berjalan dan menganggap hal itu sebagai perjalanan negara kearah yang lebih baik.

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics which is used in the social sciences (most notably economics), biology, computer science and philosophy. Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, where an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others. While initially developed to analyze competitions where one individual does better at another’s expense (zero sum games), it has been expanded to treat a wide class of interactions, which are classified according to several criteria.

Traditional applications of game theory attempt to find equilibria in these games—sets of strategies where individuals are unlikely to change their behavior. Many equilibrium concepts have been developed (most famously the Nash equilibrium) in an attempt to capture this idea. These equilibrium concepts are motivated differently depending on the field of application, although they often overlap or coincide. This methodology is not without criticism, and debates continue over the appropriateness of particular equilibrium concepts, the appropriateness of equilibria altogether, and the usefulness of mathematical models more generally.

Although some developments occurred before it, the field of game theory came into being with the 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. This theory was developed extensively in the 1950s by many scholars. Game theory was later explicitly applied to biology in the 1970s, although similar developments go back at least as far as the 1930′s. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. In total eight game theorists have won Nobel prizes in economics and John Maynard Smith was awarded the Crafoord Prize for his application of game theory to biology.

Contents

• 1 Representation of games
  • 1.1 Extensive form
  • 1.2 Normal form
  • 1.3 Characteristic function form
  • 1.4 Partition function form
• 2 Application and challenges
  • 2.1 Political science
  • 2.2 Economics and business
    • 2.2.1 Descriptive
    • 2.2.2 Prescriptive or normative analysis
  • 2.3 Biology
  • 2.4 Computer science and logic
  • 2.5 Philosophy
• 3 Types of games
  • 3.1 Cooperative or noncooperative
  • 3.2 Symmetric and asymmetric
  • 3.3 Zero sum and non-zero sum
  • 3.4 Simultaneous and sequential
  • 3.5 Perfect information and imperfect information
  • 3.6 Infinitely long games
  • 3.7 Discrete and continuous games
  • 3.8 Metagames
• 4 History
• 5 See also
• 6 Footnotes
• 7 References
  • 7.1 Textbooks and general references
  • 7.2 Historically important texts
  • 7.3 Other print references
  • 7.4 Websites

Representation of games

The games studied by game theory are well-defined mathematical objects. A game consists of a set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and a specification of payoffs for each combination of strategies. Most cooperative games are presented in the characteristic function form, while the extensive and the normal forms are used to define noncooperative games.

Extensive form

Main article: Extensive form game

An extensive form game

The extensive form can be used to formalize games with some important order. Games here are often presented as trees (as pictured to the left). Here each vertex (or node) represents a point of choice for a player. The player is specified by a number listed by the vertex. The lines out of the vertex represent a possible action for that player. The payoffs are specified at the bottom of the tree.

In the game pictured here, there are two players. Player 1 moves first and chooses either F or U. Player 2 sees Player 1′s move and then chooses A or R. Suppose that Player 1 chooses U and then Player 2 chooses A, then Player 1 gets 8 and Player 2 gets 2.

The extensive form can also capture simultaneous-move games and games with incomplete information. To represent it, either a dotted line connects different vertices to represent them as being part of the same information set (i.e., the players do not know at which point they are), or a closed line is drawn around them.

Normal form

Main article: Normal form game

The normal (or strategic form) game is usually represented by a matrix which shows the players, strategies, and payoffs (see the example to the right). More generally it can be represented by any function that associates a payoff for each player with every possible combination of actions. In the accompanying example there are two players; one chooses the row and the other chooses the column. Each player has two strategies, which are specified by the number of rows and the number of columns. The payoffs are provided in the interior. The first number is the payoff received by the row player (Player 1 in our example); the second is the payoff for the column player (Player 2 in our example). Suppose that Player 1 plays Up and that Player 2 plays Left. Then Player 1 gets a payoff of 4, and Player 2 gets 3.

When a game is presented in normal form, it is presumed that each player acts simultaneously or, at least, without knowing the actions of the other. If players have some information about the choices of other players, the game is usually presented in extensive form.

Characteristic function form

Main article: Cooperative game

In cooperative games with transferable utility no individual payoffs are given. Instead, the characteristic function determines the payoff of each coalition. The standard assumption is that the empty coalition obtains a payoff of 0.

The origin of this form is to be found in the seminal book of von Neumann and Morgenstern who, when studying coalitional normal form games, assumed that when a coalition C forms, it plays against the complementary coalition ( ) as if they were playing a 2-player game. The equilibrium payoff of C is characteristic. Now there are different models to derive coalitional values from normal form games, but not all games in characteristic function form can be derived from normal form games.

Formally, a characteristic function form game (also known as a TU-game) is given as a pair (N,v), where N denotes a set of players and is a characteristic function.

The characteristic function form has been generalised to games without the assumption of transferable utility.

Partition function form

The characteristic function form ignores the possible externalities of coalition formation. In the partition function form the payoff of a coalition depends not only on its members, but also on the way the rest of the players are partitioned (Thrall & Lucas 1963).

Application and challenges

Game theory has been used to study a wide variety of human and animal behaviors. It was initially developed in economics to understand a large collection of economic behaviors, including behaviors of firms, markets, and consumers. The use of game theory in the social sciences has expanded, and game theory has been applied to political, sociology, and psychological behaviors as well.

Game theoretic analysis was initially used to study animal behavior by Ronald Fisher in the 1930′s (although even Charles Darwin makes a few informal game theoretic statements). This work predates the name “game theory”, but it shares many important features with this field. The developments in economics were later applied to biology largely by John Maynard Smith in his book Evolution and the Theory of Games.

In addition to being used to predict and explain behavior, game theory has also been used to attempt to develop theories of ethical or normative behavior. In economics and philosophy, scholars have applied game theory to help in the understanding of good or proper behavior. Game theoretic arguments of this type can be found as far back as Plato.

Political science

The application of game theory to political science is focused in the overlapping areas of fair division, political economy, public choice, positive political theory, and social choice theory. In each of these areas, researchers have developed game theoretic models in which the players are often voters, states, interest groups, and politicians.

For early examples of game theory applied to political science, see the work of Anthony Downs. In his book An Economic Theory of Democracy  (Downs1957), he applies a Hotelling firm location model to the political process. In the Downsian model, political candidates commit to ideologies on a one-dimensional policy space. The theorist shows how the political candidates will converge to the ideology preferred by the median voter. For more recent examples, see the books by Steven Brams, George Tsebelis, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, or David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks.

A game-theoretic explanation for democratic peace is that public and open debate in democracies send clear and reliable information regarding their intentions to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy (Levy &  Razin2003)

Game theory provides a theoretical description for a variety of observable consequences of changes in governmental policies. For example, in a static world where producers were not themselves decision makers attempting to optimize their own expenditure of resources while assuming risks, response to an increase in tax rates would imply an increase in revenues and vice versa. Game Theory inclusively weights the decision making of all participants and thus explains the contrary results illustrated by the Laffer curve.

Economics and business

Economists have long used game theory to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena, including auctions, bargaining, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation, and voting systems. This research usually focuses on particular sets of strategies known as equilibria in games. These “solution concepts” are usually based on what is required by norms of rationality. In non-cooperative games, the most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies. So, if all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are doing.

The payoffs of the game are generally taken to represent the utility of individual players. Often in modeling situations the payoffs represent money, which presumably corresponds to an individual’s utility. This assumption, however, can be faulty.

A prototypical paper on game theory in economics begins by presenting a game that is an abstraction of some particular economic situation. One or more solution concepts are chosen, and the author demonstrates which strategy sets in the presented game are equilibria of the appropriate type. Naturally one might wonder to what use should this information be put. Economists and business professors suggest two primary uses.

Descriptive

A three stage Centipede Game

The first use is to inform us about how actual human populations behave. Some scholars believe that by finding the equilibria of games they can predict how actual human populations will behave when confronted with situations analogous to the game being studied. This particular view of game theory has come under recent criticism. First, it is criticized because the assumptions made by game theorists are often violated. Game theorists may assume players always act in a way to directly maximize their wins (the Homo economicus model), but in practice, humans behaviour is often contrary to this model. Explanations of this phenomenon are many; irrationality, new models of deliberation, or even different motives (like that of altruism). Game theorists respond by comparing their assumptions to those used in physics. Thus while their assumptions do not always hold, they can treat game theory as a reasonable scientific ideal akin to the models used by physicists. However, additional criticism of this use of game theory has been levied because some experiments have demonstrated that individuals do not play equilibrium strategies. For instance, in the centipede game, guess 2/3 of the average game, and the dictator game, people regularly do not play Nash equilibria. There is an ongoing debate regarding the importance of these experiments.^[1]

Alternatively, some authors claim that Nash equilibria do not provide predictions for human populations, but rather provide an explanation for why populations that play Nash equilibria remain in that state. However, the question of how populations reach those points remains open.

Some game theorists have turned to evolutionary game theory in order to resolve these worries. These models presume either no rationality or bounded rationality on the part of players. Despite the name, evolutionary game theory does not necessarily presume natural selection in the biological sense. Evolutionary game theory includes both biological as well as cultural evolution and also models of individual learning (for example, fictitious play dynamics).

Prescriptive or normative analysis

On the other hand, some scholars see game theory not as a predictive tool for the behavior of human beings, but as a suggestion for how people ought to behave. Since a Nash equilibrium of a game constitutes one’s best response to the actions of the other players, playing a strategy that is part of a Nash equilibrium seems appropriate. However, this use for game theory has also come under criticism. First, in some cases it is appropriate to play a non-equilibrium strategy if one expects others to play non-equilibrium strategies as well. For an example, see Guess 2/3 of the average.

Second, the Prisoner’s dilemma presents another potential counterexample. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player pursuing his own self-interest leads both players to be worse off than had they not pursued their own self-interests.

Biology

Unlike economics, the payoffs for games in biology are often interpreted as corresponding to fitness. In addition, the focus has been less on equilibria that correspond to a notion of rationality, but rather on ones that would be maintained by evolutionary forces. The best known equilibrium in biology is known as the Evolutionarily stable strategy or (ESS), and was first introduced by John Maynard Smith (described in his 1982 book). Although its initial motivation did not involve any of the mental requirements of the Nash equilibrium, every ESS is a Nash equilibrium.

In biology, game theory has been used to understand many different phenomena. It was first used to explain the evolution (and stability) of the approximate 1:1 sex ratios. Ronald Fisher (1930) suggested that the 1:1 sex ratios are a result of evolutionary forces acting on individuals who could be seen as trying to maximize their number of grandchildren.

Additionally, biologists have used evolutionary game theory and the ESS to explain the emergence of animal communication (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). The analysis of signaling games and other communication games has provided some insight into the evolution of communication among animals. For example, the Mobbing behavior of many species, in which a large number of prey animals attack a larger predator, seems to be an example of spontaneous emergent organization.

Biologists have used the hawk-dove game (also known as chicken) to analyze fighting behavior and territoriality.

Maynard Smith, in the preface to Evolution of the Theory of Games writes, “”[p]aradoxically, it has turned out that game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of economic behaviour for which it was originally designed.” Evolutionary game theory has been used to explain many seemingly incongruous phenomena in nature. ^[2]One such phenomena is known as biological altruism. This is a situation where an organism appears to act in a way that benefits other organisms and is detrimental to itself.

This is distinct from traditional notions of altruism because such actions are not conscious, but appear to be evolutionary adaptations to increase overall fitness. Examples can be found in species ranging from vampire bats that regurgitate blood they have obtained from a night’s hunting and give it to group members who have failed to feed, to worker bees that care for the queen bee for their entire lives and never mate, to Vervet monkeys that warn group members of a predator’s approach, even when it endangers that individual’s chance of survival. ^[3] All of these actions increase the overall fitness of a group, but occur at a cost to the individual.

Evolutionary game theory explains this altruism with the idea of kin selection. Altruists discriminate between the individuals they help and favor relatives. Hamilton’s rule explains the evolutionary reasoning behind this selection with the equation c<b*r where the cost ( c ) to the altruist must be less than the benefit ( b ) to the recipient multiplied by the coefficient of relatedness ( r ). The more closely related two organisms are causes the incidence of altruism to increase because they share many of the same alleles. This means that the altruistic individual, by ensuring that the alleles of its close relative are passed on, (through survival of its offspring) can forgo the option of having offspring itself because the same number of alleles are passed on.

Helping a sibling for example, has a coefficient of ½, because an individual shares ½ of the alleles in its sibling’s offspring. Ensuring that enough of a sibling’s offspring survive to adulthood precludes the necessity of the altruistic individual producing offspring. ^[4] Recent applications of biological game theory to humans has garnered some criticism because evolutionary analysis cannot provide a value-neutral evaluation of a given cultural situation. The valuations of whether an action is good or bad constitute an normative judgment of whether an action is altruistic. Altruism also has a different socially constructed meaning in the context of human society because all altruistic actions within culture are not instinctually driven and do not always result in increased fitness for a group. ^[5]

Computer science and logic

Game theory has come to play an increasingly important role in logic and in computer science. Several logical theories have a basis in game semantics. In addition, computer scientists have used games to model interactive computations. Also, game theory provides a theoretical basis to the field of multi-agent systems.

Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms. In particular, the k-server problem, which has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-answer games (Ben David; Borodin &  Karp et al.1994). Yao’s principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized algorithms, and especially of online algorithms.

Philosophy

Game theory has been put to several uses in philosophy. Responding to two papers by W.V.O. Quine( 1960, 1967), Lewis (1969) used game theory to develop a philosophical account of convention. In so doing, he provided the first analysis of common knowledge and employed it in analyzing play in coordination games. In addition, he first suggested that one can understand meaning in terms of signaling games. This later suggestion has been pursued by several philosophers since Lewis (Skyrms (1996), Grim; Kokalis & ( Alai-Tafti et al.2004)).

In ethics, some authors have attempted to pursue the project, begun by Thomas Hobbes, of deriving morality from self-interest. Since games like the Prisoner’s dilemma present an apparent conflict between morality and self-interest, explaining why cooperation is required by self-interest is an important component of this project. This general strategy is a component of the general social contract view in political philosophy (for examples, see Gauthier (1986) and Kavka (1986).^[6]

Other authors have attempted to use evolutionary game theory in order to explain the emergence of human attitudes about morality and corresponding animal behaviors. These authors look at several games including the Prisoner’s dilemma, Stag hunt, and the Nash bargaining game as providing an explanation for the emergence of attitudes about morality (see, e.g., ( Skyrms1996, 2004) and Sober & ( Wilson1999)).

Some assumptions used in some parts of game theory have been challenged in philosophy; psychological egoism states that rationality reduces to self-interest—a claim debated among philosophers. (see Psychological egoism#Criticism)

Types of games

Cooperative or noncooperative

Main articles: Cooperative game and Non-cooperative game

A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance the legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. In noncooperative games this is not possible. Often it is assumed that communication among players is allowed in cooperative games, but not in noncooperative ones. This classification on two binary criteria has been rejected (Harsanyi 1974).

Of the two types of games, noncooperative games are able to model situations to the finest details, producing accurate results. Cooperative games focus on the game at large. Considerable efforts have been made to link the two approaches. The so-called Nash-programme has already established many of the cooperative solutions as noncooperative equilibria. Hybrid games contain cooperative and non-cooperative elements. For instance, coalitions of players are formed in a cooperative game, but these play in a non-cooperative fashion.

Symmetric and asymmetric

Main article: Symmetric game

A symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them. If the identities of the players can be changed without changing the payoff to the strategies, then a game is symmetric. Many of the commonly studied 2×2 games are symmetric. The standard representations of chicken, the prisoner’s dilemma, and the stag hunt are all symmetric games. Some scholars would consider certain asymmetric games as examples of these games as well. However, the most common payoffs for each of these games are symmetric.

Most commonly studied asymmetric games are games where there are not identical strategy sets for both players. For instance, the ultimatum game and similarly the dictator game have different strategies for each player. It is possible, however, for a game to have identical strategies for both players, yet be asymmetric. For example, the game pictured to the right is asymmetric despite having identical strategy sets for both players.

Zero sum and non-zero sum

Main article: Zero-sum

Zero sum games are a special case of constant sum games, in which choices by players can neither increase nor decrease the available resources. In zero-sum games the total benefit to all players in the game, for every combination of strategies, always adds to zero (more informally, a player benefits only at the equal expense of others). Poker exemplifies a zero-sum game (ignoring the possibility of the house’s cut), because one wins exactly the amount one’s opponents lose. Other zero sum games include matching pennies and most classical board games including Go and chess.

Many games studied by game theorists (including the famous prisoner’s dilemma) are non-zero-sum games, because some outcomes have net results greater or less than zero. Informally, in non-zero-sum games, a gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with a loss by another.

Constant sum games correspond to activities like theft and gambling, but not to the fundamental economic situation in which there are potential gains from trade. It is possible to transform any game into a (possibly asymmetric) zero-sum game by adding an additional dummy player (often called “the board”), whose losses compensate the players’ net winnings.

Simultaneous and sequential

Main article: Sequential game

Simultaneous games are games where both players move simultaneously, or if they do not move simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the earlier players’ actions (making them effectively simultaneous). Sequential games (or dynamic games) are games where later players have some knowledge about earlier actions. This need not be perfect information about every action of earlier players; it might be very little knowledge. For instance, a player may know that an earlier player did not perform one particular action, while he does not know which of the other available actions the first player actually performed.

The difference between simultaneous and sequential games is captured in the different representations discussed above. Often, normal form is used to represent simultaneous games, and extensive form is used to represent sequential ones; although this isn’t a strict rule in a technical sense.

Perfect information and imperfect information

A game of imperfect information (the dotted line represents ignorance on the part of player 2)

Main article: Perfect information

An important subset of sequential games consists of games of perfect information. A game is one of perfect information if all players know the moves previously made by all other players. Thus, only sequential games can be games of perfect information, since in simultaneous games not every player knows the actions of the others. Most games studied in game theory are imperfect information games, although there are some interesting examples of perfect information games, including the ultimatum game and centipede game. Perfect information games include also chess, go, mancala, and arimaa.

Perfect information is often confused with complete information, which is a similar concept. Complete information requires that every player know the strategies and payoffs of the other players but not necessarily the actions.

Infinitely long games

Main article: Determinacy

Games, as studied by economists and real-world game players, are generally finished in a finite number of moves. Pure mathematicians are not so constrained, and set theorists in particular study games that last for infinitely many moves, with the winner (or other payoff) not known until after all those moves are completed.

The focus of attention is usually not so much on what is the best way to play such a game, but simply on whether one or the other player has a winning strategy. (It can be proven, using the axiom of choice, that there are games—even with perfect information, and where the only outcomes are “win” or “lose”—for which neither player has a winning strategy.) The existence of such strategies, for cleverly designed games, has important consequences in descriptive set theory.

Discrete and continuous games

Most of the objects treated in most branches of game theory are discrete, with a finite number of players, moves, events, outcomes, etc. However, the concepts can be extended into the realm of real numbers. This branch has sometimes been called differential games, because they map to a real line, usually time, although the behaviors may be mathematically discontinuous. A typical example of a differential game is the continuous pursuit and evasion game. Much of this is discussed under such subjects as optimization theory and extends into many fields of engineering and physics.

Metagames

These are games the play of which is the development of the rules for another game, the target or subject game. Metagames seek to maximize the utility value of the rule set developed. The theory of metagames is related to mechanism design theory.

History

The first known discussion of game theory occurred in a letter written by James Waldegrave in 1713. In this letter, Waldegrave provides a minimax mixed strategy solution to a two-person version of the card game le Her. It was not until the publication of Antoine Augustin Cournot‘s Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth in 1838 that a general game theoretic analysis was pursued. In this work Cournot considers a duopoly and presents a solution that is a restricted version of the Nash equilibrium.

Although Cournot’s analysis is more general than Waldegrave’s, game theory did not really exist as a unique field until John von Neumann published a series of papers in 1928. While the French mathematician Émile Borel did some earlier work on games, Von Neumann can rightfully be credited as the inventor of game theory. Von Neumann was a brilliant mathematician whose work was far-reaching from set theory to his calculations that were key to development of both the Atom and Hydrogen bombs and finally to his work developing computers. Von Neumann’s work in game theory culminated in the 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. This profound work contains the method for finding mutually consistent solutions for two-person zero-sum games. During this time period, work on game theory was primarily focused on cooperative game theory, which analyzes optimal strategies for groups of individuals, presuming that they can enforce agreements between them about proper strategies.

In 1950, the first discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma appeared, and an experiment was undertaken on this game at the RAND corporation. Around this same time, John Nash developed a criterion for mutual consistency of players’ strategies, known as Nash equilibrium, applicable to a wider variety of games than the criterion proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This equilibrium is sufficiently general, allowing for the analysis of non-cooperative games in addition to cooperative ones.

Game theory experienced a flurry of activity in the 1950s, during which time the concepts of the core, the extensive form game, fictitious play, repeated games, and the Shapley value were developed. In addition, the first applications of Game theory to philosophy and political science occurred during this time.

In 1965, Reinhard Selten introduced his solution concept of subgame perfect equilibria, which further refined the Nash equilibrium (later he would introduce trembling hand perfection as well). In 1967, John Harsanyi developed the concepts of complete information and Bayesian games. Nash, Selten and Harsanyi became Economics Nobel Laureates in 1994 for their contributions to economic game theory.

In the 1970s, game theory was extensively applied in biology, largely as a result of the work of John Maynard Smith and his evolutionarily stable strategy. In addition, the concepts of correlated equilibrium, trembling hand perfection, and common knowledge^[7] were introduced and analysed.

In 2005, game theorists Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann followed Nash, Selten and Harsanyi as Nobel Laureates. Schelling worked on dynamic models, early examples of evolutionary game theory. Aumann contributed more to the equilibrium school, introducing an equilibrium coarsening, correlated equilibrium, and developing an extensive formal analysis of the assumption of common knowledge and of its consequences.

In 2007, Roger Myerson, together with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin, was awarded of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory.” Among his contributions, is also the notion of proper equilibrium, and an important graduate text: Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict, published in 1991.

Footnotes

1. ^ Experimental work in game theory goes by many names, experimental economics, behavioral economics, and behavioural game theory are several. For a recent discussion on this field see Camerer (2003).
2. ^ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
3. ^ http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/altruism-biological/
4. ^ http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/altruism-biological/
5. ^ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
6. ^ For a more detailed discussion of the use of Game Theory in ethics see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry game theory and ethics.
7. ^ Although common knowledge was first discussed by the philosopher David Lewis in his dissertation (and later book) Convention in the late 1960s, it was not widely considered by economists until Robert Aumann‘s work in the 1970s.

 Textbooks and general references

• Aumann, Robert J. (1987), Game Theory, vol. 2, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, pp. 460–82.

• Dutta, Prajit K. (1999), Strategies and games: theory and practice, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-04169-0. Suitable for undergraduate and business students.

• Fernandez, L F. & Bierman, H S. (1998), Game theory with economic applications, Addison-Wesley, ISBN 978-0-201-84758-1. Suitable for upper-level undergraduates.

• Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean (1991), Game theory, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-06141-4. Acclaimed reference text, public description.

• Gibbons, Robert D. (1992), Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-00395-5. Suitable for advanced undergraduates.

·         Published in Europe as A Primer in Game Theory, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, ISBN 978-0-7450-1159-2.

• Gintis, Herbert (2000), Game theory evolving: a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic behavior, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-00943-8

• Green, Jerry R.; Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. (1995), Microeconomic theory, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-507340-9. Presents game theory in formal way suitable for graduate level.

• Hansen, Pelle G. & Hendricks, Vincent F., eds., Game Theory: 5 Questions, New York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, ISBN 9788799101344. Snippets from interviews.

• Isaacs, Rufus, Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory With Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization, New York: Dover Publications, ISBN 978-0-486-40682-4

• Miller, James H. (2003), Game theory at work: how to use game theory to outthink and outmaneuver your competition, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 978-0-07-140020-6. Suitable for a general audience.

• Myerson, Roger B. (1997), Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-674-34116-6

• Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An introduction to game theory, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-512895-6. Undergraduate textbook.

• Poundstone, William (1992), Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb, Anchor, ISBN 978-0-385-41580-4. A general history of game theory and game theoreticians.

• Rasmusen, Eric (2006), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (4th ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 978-1-4051-3666-2, <http://www.rasmusen.org/GI/index.html>

• Rubinstein, Ariel & Osborne, Martin J. (1994), A course in game theory, MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-65040-3. A modern introduction at the graduate level.

• Williams, John Davis (1954), The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy, Santa Monica: RAND Corp. Praised primer and popular introduction for everybody, never out of print.

Historically important texts

• Aumann, R.J. and Shapley, L.S. (1974), Values of Non-Atomic Games, Princeton University Press

• Cournot, A. Augustin (1838), “Recherches sur les principles mathematiques de la théorie des richesses”, Libraire des sciences politiques et sociales (Paris: M. Rivière & C.ie)

• Edgeworth, Francis Y. (1881), Mathematical Psychics, London: Kegan Paul

• Fisher, Ronald (1930), The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Oxford: Clarendon Press

·         reprinted edition: The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection: A Complete Variorum Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 978-0-19-850440-5

• Luce, R. Duncan & Raiffa, Howard (1989), Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey, New York: Dover Publications, ISBN 978-0-486-65943-5

• Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-28884-2

• Nash, John (1950), “Equilibrium points in n-person games“, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36 (1): 48–49, ISSN 0027-8424, <http://www.pnas.org/cgi/search?sendit=Search&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage=&DOI=&author1=nash&author2=&title=equilibrium&andorexacttitle=and&titleabstract=&andorexacttitleabs=and&fulltext=&andorexactfulltext=and&fmonth=Jan&fyear=1915&tmonth=Feb&tyear=2008&fdatedef=15+January+1915&tdatedef=6+February+2008&tocsectionid=all&RESULTFORMAT=1&hits=10&hitsbrief=25&sortspec=relevance&sortspecbrief=relevance>

• Shapley, L.S. (1953), A Value for n-person Games, In: Contributions to the Theory of Games volume II, H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds.)

• Shapley, L.S. (1953), Stochastic Games, Proceedings of National Academy of Science Vol. 39, pp. 1095-1100.

• von Neumann, John (1928), “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftspiele“, Mathematische Annalen 100 (1): 295–320, ISSN 0025-5831, <http://www.digizeitschriften.de/home/services/pdfterms/?ID=363311>

• von Neumann, John & Morgenstern, Oskar (1944), Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press

• Zermelo, Ernst (1913), “Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels”, Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians 2: 501–4

Other print references

• Ben David, S.; Borodin, Allan & Karp, Richard et al. (1994), “On the Power of Randomization in On-line Algorithms“, Algorithmica 11 (1): 2–14, <http://www.math.ias.edu/~avi/PUBLICATIONS/MYPAPERS/BORODIN/paper.pdf>
• Camerer, Colin (2003), Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction, Russesll Sage Foundation, ISBN 978-0-691-09039-9
• Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic theory of Democracy, New York: Harper
• Gauthier, David (1986), Morals by agreement, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-824992-4
• Grim, Patrick; Kokalis, Trina & Alai-Tafti, Ali et al. (2004), “Making meaning happen”, Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 16 (4): 209–243
• Harsanyi, John C. (1974), “An equilibrium point interpretation of stable sets”, Management Science 20: 1472–1495
• Kavka, Gregory S. (1986), Hobbesian moral and political theory, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-02765-4
• Lewis, David (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study, ISBN 978-0-631-23257-5 (2002 edition)
• Harper, David & Maynard Smith, John (2003), Animal signals, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-852685-8
• Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny (2003), “It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace“, Working Paper, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=433844>
• Quine, W.v.O (1967), “Truth by Convention”, Philosophica Essays for A.N. Whitehead, Russel and Russel Publishers, ISBN 978-0-8462-0970-6
• Quine, W.v.O (1960), “Carnap and Logical Truth”, Synthese 12 (4): 350–374
• Skyrms, Brian (1996), Evolution of the social contract, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-55583-8
• Skyrms, Brian (2004), The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-53392-8
• Sober, Elliott & Wilson, David Alec (1999), Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior, Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-674-93047-6
• Thrall, Robert M. & Lucas, William F. (1963), “n-person games in partition function form”, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 10 (4): 281–298

Websites

• Paul Walker: History of Game Theory Page.
• David Levine: Game Theory. Papers, Lecture Notes and much more stuff.
• Alvin Roth: Game Theory and Experimental Economics page – Comprehensive list of links to game theory information on the Web
• Mike Shor: Game Theory .net – Lecture notes, interactive illustrations and other information.
• Jim Ratliff’s Graduate Course in Game Theory (lecture notes).
• Valentin Robu’s software tool for simulation of bilateral negotiation (bargaining)
• Don Ross: Review Of Game Theory in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Bruno Verbeek and Christopher Morris: Game Theory and Ethics
• Chris Yiu’s Game Theory Lounge
• Elmer G. Wiens: Game Theory – Introduction, worked examples, play online two-person zero-sum games.
• Marek M. Kaminski: Game Theory and Politics – syllabuses and lecture notes for game theory and political science.
• Web sites on game theory and social interactions
• Kesten Green’s Conflict Forecasting – See Papers for evidence on the accuracy of forecasts from game theory and other methods.
• McKelvey, Richard D., McLennan, Andrew M., and Turocy, Theodore L. (2007) Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory.

Berdasarkan analisa dari kapabilitas politik negara, terutama jika dilihat dari basis Ideologi dan Militernya, Papua Nugini berpotensi untuk menjadi negara adidaya kelak nanti. Hal ini terlihat dari kekuatan militer yang dimiliki yakni :

Kekuatan pertahanan Papua Nugini ( PNGDF-Papua New Guinea Defence Force ) merupakan kesatuan angkatan bersenjata Papua Nugini, PNGDF ini pada awalnya merupakan suatu kekuatan dari angkatan darat PNG yang pada masa itu merupakan wilayah jajahan Australia sebelum memproklamirkan kemerdekaan pada tahun 1975, dari rezim kekuasaan raja di kepulauan Pasifik.

Dan kemudian rezim tersebut bubar setelah perang dunia ke-II, dan telah mengalami perubahan pada tahun 1951. Pertama, kekuatan militer darat terdiri dari 1 PIR Taurama Barrak di sebelah tenggara Pelabuhan Moresby. Di tahun 1965 batalion barisan kedua, 2 PIR, ditempatkan di Wewak. Kekuatan militer darat termasuk didalamnya satu batalion masinis di Barak Igam di Lae, satu skuadron pengirim radar sinyal, dan unit artileri bahan persenjataan, dan alat kesehatan.

Bagian kekuatan operasi diwilayah perairan terdiri dari empat kapal kelas patroli pasifik ( mendapatkan dukungan dari program kapal patroli pasifik Australia ) dan dua landasan kapal ( kelas Balikpapan LCHs ). Bagian kekuatan operasi di udara atau squadron transportasi udara diantaranya adalah Squadron kapal CASA CN-235, GAF Nomad N-22, IAI Arava-101, MBB Bo-105, Bell UH-1H Iroquis, dioperasikan beberapa helikopter dan mercusuar di pangkalan pesawat di Port Moresby.

Salah satu keberhasilan dari militer Papua Nugini adalah penyelesaian permasalahan hubungan diperbatasan pada tahun 1997, ketika panglima tertinggi PNGDF Jerry Singirok berusaha mengatasi terjadinya pemberontakan di Bouganville oleh para pembelot.

Kemudian berdasarkan Ideologinya, Pemerintahan Papua Nugini berada dibawah konstitusi 1975, merupakan negara dengan sistem demokrasi Parlementer dibawah kekuasaan Monarki konstitusional, selain itu negara ini juga tergabung dalam organisasi persemakmuran yang mengakui monarki Inggris sebagai raja yang berkuasa, dan sebagai simbol kepala Negara.

Lembaga Negaranya adalah Majelis Parlemen Unikameral. Perdana Menteri adalah kepala pemerintahan yaitu pimpinan dari partai mayoritas  dalam majelis parlemen dan membentuk kabinetnya diantara para anggota parlemen. Kepala negara merupakan Ratu Inggris yang diwakili oleh seorang gubernur jenderal. Kepala Pemerintahan dipimpin oleh seorang Perdana Menteri. Badan Legislatif : Majelis parlemen. Badan yudikatif : pengadilan agung, dan pengadilan nasional.

2.       Analisa bandingan potensi ancaman kawasan dan dunia

Sebagai sebuah negara yang kaya akan sumber daya alam, menjadikan negara Papua Nugini rawan akan berbagai konflik. Konflik ini tentu saja tidak datang dari tubuh internal dalam negeri seperti perebutan ladang minyak di Bougenville, konflik ini juga datang dari negara lain seperti masalah perbatasan dengan negara Indonesia. Namun Berdasarkan kawasan di Asia Pasifik, negara yang dianggap memiliki ancaman yang sangat besar yang bisa membahayakan kedulatan negara Papua Nugini adalah Australia yang terlihat dari berbagai sepak terjang kekuatan militer terhadap negara lain, beserta basis ideologi negara tersebut.

Seperti keterlibatan pasukan Australia pada saat terjadi perang Vietnam, serta penempatan berbagai pasukan keamanan diberbagai negara seperti di Korea Selatan, Vietnam, Semenanjung Malaysia dan Serawak di Malaysia Timur sebagai kerjasama pertahanan dengan Inggris dan Amerika Serikat. Yang mana hal ini merupakan konsep Forward Defence Australia sebagai upaya menjaga keamanan atau tangkisan terhadap berbagai aksi yang dapat membahayakan Australia.

3.       Langkah Papua Nugini untuk bisa menjadi negara adidaya

Berdasarkan kekuatan militer, basis ideologi, dan faktor penunjang lainnya seperti keadaan ekonomi dan politik yang dimiliki Papua Nugini, serta keterampilan para tentara dalam mengamankan wilayah Papua Nugini, hal ini bukan merupakan suatu hal yang mustahil apabila kelak nanti Papua Nugini akan menjadi Leader di dunia Internasional. Hal ini terbukti dari kesigapan dari para tentara ketika menyelesaikan permasalahan diperbatasan pada tahun 1997, ketika panglima tertinggi PNGDF Jerry Singirok berusaha mengatasi terjadinya pemberontakan di Bouganville oleh para pembelot.

Selain itu Papua Nugini yang juga tergabung kedalam berbagai organsasi internasional seperti ACP, ADB, APEC, ARF, ASEAN (observer), CCP, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, telah menjadikannya sebagai suatu tahapan untuk bekerjasama dan berinteraksi dengan negara lain di dunia.

Terkait dengan hal tersebut diatas, Papua Nugini sebagai negara yang berdaulat, tentu saja akan bekerjasama dan berinteraksi dengan negara lainnya, untuk pemenuhan kepentingan nasional yang tidak didapatkan dari dalam negerinya. Hal ini ditandai dengan adanya perwakilan ambassador di beberapa negara seperti : Eropa, Amerika, Asia, dan Oseania. Dari berbagai aktifitas yang dilakukan oleh Papua Nugini untuk mempromosikan negaranya terhadap dunia luar merupakan suatu usaha yang bagus demi tercapainya tujuan negara yakni menjadi pemimpin bagia negara didunia.

Berdasarkan kawasan di Asia Pasifik, terdapat negara yang dianggap akan mengancam kedulatan negara Papua Nugini. Hal ini terlihat dari sepak terjang kekuatan militer beserta basis ideologi Liberal negara tersebut. Negara itu tiada lain adalah negara Australia yang dalam kancah dunia Internasional Australia ini selalu ikut terhadap kebijakan wejangan ‘paman sam’. Sebagai contoh : Kekuatan militer Aussie pada tahun 1950-1960an yang menganut konsep Forward Defence ( hal ini berarti Australia menempatkan pasukannya diluar negaranya sendiri seperti pasukan di Korea Selatan, Vietnam, Semenanjung Malaysia dan Serawak di Malaysia Timur sebagai kerjasama pertahanan dengan Inggris dan Amerika Serikat ).

Pada saat perang Vietnam Australia mengerahkan lebih dari 6.000 pasukannya, Kekuatan militer yang dimiliki diantaranya : Armour Personal Carrier M113A1 ( dilengkapi dengan senapan mesin Browning kaliber 7,62mm ganda dari kendaraan lapis baja V-100 Commando, dan panser VF.601 Saladin dengan kanon kaliber 76mm ). Untuk angkatan udara ( RAAF-Royal Australian Air Force ) menempatkan helikopter UH-1H Iroquois dan pesawat Caribou di Vung Tau, Vietnam, selama tujuh setengah tahun. Pesawat Caribou, delapan helikopter UH-1H dari Skadron-5/Helikopter yang berpangkalan di Canberra pernah bergabung dengan pasukan Multinasional di El Gorah, Sinai di Mesir.

Selain kekuatan militer yang dimiliki diatas, terdapat pesawat tempur F-18A Hornet (dipersenjatai dengan peluru kendali udara-ke-udara jarak pendek AIM-9 Sidewinder dan AIM-7 Sparrow jarak jauh, kanon 20mm, bom konvensional dan peluru kendali anti kapal dengan sistem kendali laser AGM-84A Harpoon berhulu ledak 910 kg ) , pesawat buru sergap segala cuaca Mirage IIIQ, dua Skadron P-3C Orion yang berpangkalan di Eidenburgh, Australia Selatan, masing-masing Skadron-10 dan Skadron-11/Intai Maritim. Kekuatan militer juga terlihat dalam statistik sebagai berikut :

Dari data kekuatan militer Australi diatas, beserta contoh ekspansi terhadap negara lain, terlihat bahwasannya Australia merupakan negara besar yang berpotensi mengancam keberlangsungan tatanan politik Papua Nugini. Selain Australia masih terdapat satu negara lagi yang dianggap memiliki potensi ancaman wilayah Papua Nugini, yaitu Indonesia. Dengan Indonesia yang secara geografis berbatasan secara langsung, akan memberikan pengaruh yang sangat besar yakni masalah perbatasan wilayah.

Dalam suatu organisasi internasional biasanya terdiri dari beberapa unsur seperti:

1.      Kerjasama yang ruang lingkupnya melewati batas negara;

2.      Mencapai tujuan-tujuan yang disepakati bersama;

3.      Baik itu antar lembaga pemerintah maun lembaga non-pemerintah;

4.      Adanya struktur organisasi yang jelas dan lengkap.

Dari beberapa definisi diatas mengenai organisasi internasional, kita dapat mengambil kesimpulan bahwa organisasi internasional merupakan suatu kumpulan dari berbagai aktor, baik itu aktor pemerintah maupaun aktor non pemerintah untuk bekerjasama dan berinteraksi dalam suatu wadah yang disebabkan karena adanya kepentingan bersama untuk tujuan tertentu. Kerjasama ini diperlukan oleh karena adanya pemenuhan kepentingan nasional dari suatu negara yang mana pemenuhan kepentingan nasionalnya tersebut tidak saja bisa terpenuhi dari dalam negeri itu sendiri akan tetapi juga yang berasal dari luar negeri.

Sebagai mana yang diungkapkan oleh Mochtar Mas’oed bahwasannya “Kerjasama Internasional adalah interaksi tanpa konflik, dalam arti suatu kerjasama mempunyai persoalan yang terletak pada pencapaian tujuan kerjasama itu, bukan terletak pada identifikasi tujuan hubungan internasional antar negara, untuk menjamin keberhasilan kerjasama internasional harus dipenuhi syarat utama yaitu adanya kepentingan bersama atau lebih tegas lagi real community of interest, hal ini menunjukkan pada kesediaan kepentingan bersama secara sukarela”. ( Mochtar Mas’oed, 1990 : ).

Berkenaan dengan kerjasama internasional, Papua Nugini juga menjalin hubungan dengan negara lain guna mencapai tujuan nasionalnya. Diantaranya adalah bahwa Papua Nugini tergabung kedalam beberapa organisasi internasional seperti : ACP, ADB, APEC, ARF, ASEAN (observer), C, CP, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO.

Manager CIPNG untuk penanganan masalah darurat dan pertumbuhan masyarakat Doreen Iga mengatakan bahwa diperlukan penanganan yang lebih terhadap dampak dari tanah longsor tersebut. Sedangkan direktur kota CIPNG, Henry Braun mengatakan terimakasihnya terhadap CARE karena telah mendukung NZAID untuk menangani korban longsor tersebut.

Respon CARE sepanjang sejarah dalam penanganan terhadap bencana selalu efektif dan cepat baik itu di PNG dan diseluruh dunia, dan bekerjasama dengan berbagai donor antar negara seperti NZAID dan partner Pemerintah. Selama ini dalam berbagai aktifitasny CARE PNG telah berjasa dalam penangan Tsunami, kekeringan, letusan gunung merapi di Manam dan banjir di Oro.

Umumnya dapat dikatakan bahwa peperangan dimulai pada saat pendudukan jerman di Polandia tanggal 1 september 1939 – 15 agustus 1945 pada saat jepang menyerah pada tentara Amerika Serikat. Namun meskipun demikian ada yang berpendapat bahwa perang sebenarnya sudah dimulai sejak 1 maret 1937 ketika Jepang menduduki Manchuria. Dalam perang ini diperkirakan memakan korban 50.000.000 juta jiwa.

Berkenaan dengan perang, Papua Nugini sebagai salah satu aktor negara di dunia juga telah mengalami berbagai macam peperangan. Baik itu perang yang bersifat internal dalam perebutan sumber kekayaan ( minyak ) maupun perang dalam skala internasional seperti usaha untuk merebut kemerdekaan dari negara kolonial. Selain itu pada saat Papua masih menjadi wilayah kolonial jepang, terutama pada masa perang dunia ke-II, yakni pada mei 1942 di tenggara laut Port Moresby terjadi pertempuran ‘ battle of the coral sea’, dan terjadi lagi pada agustus oleh tentara Australia di teluk Milne untuk memaksa mundur pasukan jepang dari kawasan Buna Gona diwilayah tenggara papua nugini, dan di Guadalcanal pertahanan Jepang runtuh pada tahun 1943.

Dalam hal ini Papua nugini yang terletak di timurlaut Australia, merupakan sebuah negara yang terbentuk dari bagian sebuah pulau yang sangat besar ditambah banyak pulau yang lebih kecil dan beberapa gugus pulau. Sebagian besar wilayahnya terletak disebelah timur kepulauan Indonesia yang besar, yang ikut membentuk perbatasan antara Samudra Hindia dan Samudra Pasifik. Selama berabad-abad silam pulau-pulau ini berfungsi sebagai batu loncatan bagi migrasi sejumlah besar bangsa-bangsa Asia. Papua nugini yang semula diurus oleh Australia, kemudian merdeka pada tahun 1975 dan menjadi negara berdaulat.

Interaksi antara masyarakat dengan dunia luar sebenarnya sudah dimulai semenjak dulu ketika terjadinya migrasi dari Asia melalui kepulauan indonesia seperti nelayan, pemburu, petani, yang memperkenalkan berbagai macam budidaya pertanian dan peternakan terhadap warga sekitar. Terlebih setelah datangnya bangsa eropa seperti Spanyol dan Portugis pada abad ke-16. Pada abad ke-19 Belanda menempati Irian bagian barat, Jerman dan Inggris juga mendirikan koloninya dibagian timurlaut pulau dan disebelah tenggara. Kamudian pada 1906 Australia mengambil alih Irian wilayah Inggris dan memerintahnya sebagai wilayah Papua, dan mengambil alih Irian wilayah Jerman pada permulaan PD ke-I kemudian mengurusnya sebagai wilayah Nugini. Selain itu, Papua Nugini juga melakukan suatu kerjasama dalam berbagai bidang seperti kesehatan, perekonomian, pengamanan wilayah, dan juga tergabung kedalam beberapa organisasi dunia.

Pemenuhan kepentingan nasional suatu negara tidak saja didapat dari dalam negri negara tersebut, akan tetapi didapat juga dari dunia luar. Maka dari itu diperlukan suatu alat atau cara untuk melakukan interaksi dengan dunia luar. Salah satu diantaranya adalah melalui diplomasi.

Harold Nicholson mengatakan bahwa diplomasi adalah 1. Manajemen HI melalui negosiasi, 2. Merupakan bisnis atau seni para diplomat. Sedangkan K.M. Paniker mengatakan bahwa diplomasi adalah seni mengedepankan kepentingan suatu negara dalam hubungan dengan negara lain.

Dari beberapa pengertian diatas dapat diketahui bahwasannya diplomasi adalah suatu usaha pemenuhan kepentingan nasional suatu negara dalam hubungannya dengan negara lain. Dalam hal ini kepentingan nasional merupakan suatu unsur penting dalam negosiasi maupun dalam kerjasama untuk pemenuhan kepentingan nasional suatu negara tersebut.

Terkait dengan hal tersebut diatas, Papua Nugini sebagai negara yang berdaulat, tentu saja akan bekerjasama dan berinteraksi dengan negara lainnya, untuk pemenuhan kepentingan nasional yang tidak didapatkan dari dalam negerinya. Hal ini ditandai dengan adanya perwakilan ambassador di beberapa negara seperti :

Eropa

-          Inggris

Komisaris utama ( High-Commission ) di london

Amerika Utara

-          Amerika Serikat

Kedutaan besar ( Embassy ) berada di Washington DC

Asia

-          China

Kedutaan besar berada di Beijing

-          Indonesia

Kedutaan besar berada di Jakarta

Jendral konsulat ( Consulate General ) di Jayapura

-          Jepang

Kedutaan besar berada di Tokyo

-          Malaysia

High-Commission ( Kuala Lumpur )

-          Philipina

Kedutaan besar berada di Manila

Oseania

-          Australia

Komisaris utama ( High-Commission ) di Canberra

Jendral konsulat (Consulate General ) di Brisbane

-          Fiji

Komisaris utama ( High-Commission ) di Suva

-          Selandia Baru

Komisaris utama ( High-Commission ) di Wellington

-          Kepulauan Solomon

Komisaris utama ( High-Commission ) di Honiara